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SECTION 2056(b) (5): AN "APPARENT" OR "REAL"
EXCEPTION TO THE TERMINABLE INTEREST RULE?
I. Introduction
Section 2056 of the 1954 Internal Revenue Code provides for a deduction
from the decedents gross estate for property passing to his or her surviving
spouse.' This provision was designed to alleviate the disparity in estate tax bur-
dens between residents of community property and common law jurisdictions.2
While the basic policy of the marital deduction has always been tax equalization,
the courts have taken various approaches and constructions in the course of its
application.
The vast majority have strictly construed the statute and regulations. Re-
cently, however, some courts have reanalyzed the historical development of the
marital deduction and the congressional intent underlying its enactment. The
result has been a more flexible approach and application of the § 2056 provisions.
In particular, § 2056(b) (5),1 the life estate with power of appointment excep-
tion to the terminable interest rule, has been favorably applied for the taxpayer.
The analysis below traces the transition from the treatment of § 2056(b) (5) as
a very narrow and tightly drawn exception to a restatement of the basic policy
and rationale behind the marital deduction.
In part the disparate treatment of § 2056(b) (5) can be traced to differing
judicial thought concerning the congressional purpose in the enactment of the
marital deduction itself.' Immediately after enactment, prevalent judicial
opinion supported the view that the provisions were designed to equate as near
as possible estate taxes between community property and common law states.5
"Virtual ownership" characterized the type of property interest that the sur-
viving spouse was required to receive in order to qualify for the deduction. The
courts, reluctant to expand the deduction beyond this type of interest, strictly
interpreted the statute. Yet, the statutory provisions and relevant legislative
history did not support this narrow construction. Only recently have these sources
been seen as supporting a more liberal interpretation.
Modem thinking on the subject, developed within the last two decades,
argues that Congress intended to liberalize and extend the exclusion of marital
transfers from the taxable estate in enacting § 2056; accordingly, restrictive inter-
pretations of the marital deduction provisions are not warranted. This view
recently garnered support from the Supreme Court! and its significance to the life
estate with power of appointment exception (§ 2056(b) (5)) will become ap-
parent in the discussion below.
1 INT. RaV. CODE of 1954, § 2056.
2 See Northeastern Pa. Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. v. United States, 387 U.S. 213, 219(1967); Jackson v. United States, 376 U.S. 503, 510 (1964); United States v. Stapf, 375
U.S. 118, 128 (1964).
3 INT. REV. CODE of 1954.
4 For a general discussion of congressional purpose in enactment of marital deduction
provisions see 4 MERTENS, LAW OF FEDERAL GIFT & ESTATE TAXATION § 29.01 (Supp. 1972)
[hereinafter cited as MERTENS].
5 Id.
6 Northeastern Pa. Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. v. United States, 387 U.S. 213 (1967).
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In a larger context, it can be said that the metamorphosis which has oc-
curred in the general marital deduction provision is fast becoming evident in its
component parts, specifically § 2056(b) (5). This particular provision has also
received dissimilar and at times conflicting treatment by the courts.' On the one
hand the Commissioner of Internal Revenue and most courts have taken a strict
constructionist approach to the exception, requiring inflexible and precise com-
pliance with the statutory exception and its subsequent regulations. For example,
in Estate of May v. Commissioner' the surviving spouse was given a life interest
in the residuary estate with "the right in the sole discretion of my said wife to
invade and use the principal not only for necessities but generally for her comfort,
happiness and well-being."9 A marital deduction was disallowed because the
statute required the power of appointment to be exercisable in all events. Since
New York case law required the wife to use good faith in exercising power, it was
therefore held not exercisable in all events.'
At the other end of the spectrum, Estate of Mittleman v. Commissioner"
allowed a deduction where the testator created a trust of the residuary estate
"[tio provide for the proper support, maintenance, welfare and comfort ' 12 of
his wife. The Commissioner and Tax Court had determined that the trust failed
to qualify because the spouse did not have the right to the entire income from the
trust.'" Reversing, the appellate court stated: "We hold.., that where a testator
intends to create a trust qualifying for the marital deduction, ambiguities in his
will should, if possible, be resolved in favor of success in that endeavor.""'
Cases such as Mittleman are, then, indicative of a judicial shift in inter-
preting 2056(b) (5) as a strict, "real" exception to a more liberal, "apparent"
exception to the terminable interest rule.
Indeed, it is submitted that the differing conceptions of § 2056(b) (5) can
best be understood in the context of determining whether the provision is a
"real" or an "apparent" exception to the terminable interest rule. This article
will explore the historical and legislative background of the marital deduction
in an attempt to analyze the nature and scope of § 2056(b) (5). Case analysis
will be used to further analyze the competing theories and to indicate the po-
tential practical ramifications of each.
II. Background
A. The General Framework for Analysis
The use of a "real" and "apparent" exception framework in subsequent
analysis stems in part from Mittleman where the court characterized § 2056
(b) (5) as "an apparent-though hardly a real-exception to the terminable-
7 See generally, Note, Life Estate with Power of Appointment: An Exception to the
Terminable Interest Rule, 17 W. REsERVE L. Ryv. 863 (1966).
8 283 F.2d 853 (2d Cir. 1960).
9 Id. at 854.
10' Id. at 855-56.
11 Civil No. 73-2001 (D.C. Cir. Nov. 3, 1975).
12 Id.
13 Estate of Jerome Mittleman, 42 P-H TAx CT. MEre. DnE. 73,112 (1973).
14 Estate of Mittleman v. Commissioner, Civil No. 73-2001 (D.C. Cir. Nov. 3, 1975).
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interest rule."'5 Throughout this discussion the real versus apparent dichotomy
is used in an analogous manner to the usage of the two concepts in the law of
evidence, i.e. real versus apparent exceptions to the hearsay rule. Section 2056
(b) (5) will be designated as an apparent exception in the sense that it is not
technically an exception to the terminable interest rule, but something outside
and independent of the terminable interest rule itself. The consequences of such
a conceptualization are far reaching. Overly restrictive Treasury regulations
curtailing the availability of the deduction are not applicable. Practically, the
taxpayer may save thousands of tax dollars. Moreover, inartfully drawn bequests
which do not comply with the highly technical regulations may alternatively
qualify for the deduction if § 2056(b) (5) is conceptualized as an apparent as
opposed to real exception.
The real exception approach, on the other hand, dictates that those property
interests which fall within § 2056(b) (5) are genuine terminable interests for
which only a carefully circumscribed statutory exception is avaliable. If §
2056(b) (5) is properly a real exception, strict statutory construction and care-
fully drafted regulations limiting the availability of the deduction are appropriate.
B. History of the Marital Deduction
Prior to 1942, residents of community property states enjoyed a distinct
estate tax advantage over their common law counterparts."0 In community
property states each spouse is considered the fee simple owner of one-half of the
community wealth. Thus, only one-half of the community property is included
in the gross estate of the first spouse to die; taxation of the survivor's one-half is
deferred until his or her death. Comparatively, in common law states one spouse
typically owns the vast majority of property. This fact combined with sharply
progressive estate tax rates resulted in a significantly higher tax on transfers in
common law states than on transfers of similar size in community property
states.' Accordingly, Congress enacted legislation in 1942 designed to produce
a more equitable result.'8
The 1942 Revenue Act included ameliorative estate tax provisions intended
to eliminate the advantage enjoyed by community property residents by requiring
the entire amount of community property to be included in the gross estate of
the first spouse to die. 9 While a significant step toward equalization, the legis-
lation failed to be the expected panacea. Transfers made in community property
states frequently incurred more or less taxation than did comparable transfers in
common law jurisdictions for various reasons.20 For example, if the husband in a
common law state bequeathed a life estate to his wife, with the remainder over
to the children, at his death the entire estate is taxed, but at the wife's death
15 Id.
16 See, e.g., BrrTKER, FEDERAL INCOME ESTATE AND GIFT TAXATION 1106-13 (3d ed.
1964) [hereinafter cited as BrrTKER].
17 See S. REP. No. 1013 80th Cong., 2d Sess. pt. 1, at 26 (1948) [hereinafter cited as S.
REP. No. 1013]; 1948-1 Cum. Bull. 285, 303-05.
18 See Revenue Act of 1942, adding §§ 811(d)(5), 811 (e)(2), and 811(g)(4) to INT.
REV. CODE Of 1939. See also MERTENS, supraz note 4, at § 29.01.
19 Brrrxmz, supra note 16, at 1107.
20 See S. REP. No. 1013, supra note 17, at 26-27.
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there is no tax on the cessation of her life estate. Conversely, if a husband in a
community property state was to bequeath his one-half interest in the com-
munity property under an identical arrangement, the entire community property
may be included in his gross estate, and on the death of his wife, one-half the
community property is also included in her estate. Thus, the common law couple
is subject only to a single transfer tax, whereas the community property couple
pays two transfer taxes.2 Additionally, burdensome tracing problems were en-
countered since the 1942 statute exempted that portion of property "as may be
shown to have been received as compensation for personal services actually
rendered by the surviving spouse or derived originally from such compensation
or from separate property of the surviving spouse."22
Dissatisfaction with the 1942 estate tax provisions led to their repeal in
1948 and enactment of what is essentially the current marital deduction.23 Con-
gress, reiterating its goal of equalization, reversed its approach and directed the
new law at common law jurisdictions. As a corollary to "income-splitting" be-
tween spouses in common law states, "estate-splitting" was devised as a means
of placing the two systems in parity. 4 Basically, the newly formulated marital
deduction allowed the common law testator to transfer up to one-half of his
adjusted gross estate to his spouse free from estate taxes. Predictably, however,
Congress enacted exceptions to this general rule.
C. The Terminable Interest Rule
At the time the 1948 deduction was enacted, Congress was aware that per-
fect geographic equality was unattainable. 5 Obviously, the inherent differences
in the forms of ownership and manner of passing property between the commu-
nity and separate property systems precluded this result. However, in a con-
gressional attempt to achieve approximate equality, the deduction required that
interests in property pass outright to the surviving spouse-the so-called "termi-
nable interest" rule." The rule provides that the marital deduction is unavail-
able for those interests that terminate after a lapse of time, or on the occurrence
or nonoccurrence of an event, and then pass from the surviving spouse to a third
party.2" This portion of the statute attempts to achieve substantial quantitative
and qualitative equality between the community property and common law
states. Quantitatively, the rule is designed to insure equal taxation; qualitatively,
to equalize the nature of interests entitled to this beneficial tax treatment.
1. Quantitative Equality
In community property states surviving spouses are entitled to their share
21 Id.
22 Rev. Act of 1942, § 402, 56 Stat. 941 (1942).
23 S. REP. No. 1013, supra note 17, at 27. See generally, 4 RASKIN & JOHNSON, FEDERAL
INCOME GIFT AND ESTATE TAXATION § 53.04 (1976) [hereinafter cited as RABsIN].
24 Revenue Act of 1948, ch. 168, §§ 351, 361, 62 Stat. 116 (1948), amending INT. REv.
CODE of 1939, ch. 3, § 812, 53 Stat. 123 (1939).
25 See S. REP. No. 1013, supra note 17, at 26.
26 INT. REV. CODE of 1939, § 812(e)(1)(B) (now INT. REv. CODE of 1954 § 2056
(b) (1)).
27 INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 2056(b) (1).
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of community property outright. The tax consequences are apparent: if the
property is given away, it is subject to gift tax; if control of the property is re-
tained until death, the estate tax is applicable.28 Thus, in all cases other than
consumption this property will be taxed in some form during the life of the sur-
viving spouse or at her death. Conversely, the possibility of completely avoiding
any tax would exist in common law jurisdictions if terminable interests qualified
for the deduction. For example, if the survivor was given a life estate with a
remainder to others, the property would qualify for the deduction and escape
taxation in the survivor's estate. Thus, substantial quantitative equality is accom-
plished only by disqualifying the marital deduction in such a case.29
2. Qualitative Equality
Qualitatively, a decedent in a community property state cannot by will or
other means effect the surviving spouse's interest in community property."0 A
husband, for example, cannot leave his wife with only a life estate in her one-
half of the community property as she already owns a fee interest. Allowing a
marital deduction for terminable interests would permit a common law resident
a wider choice of dispositions upon which the same tax advantages would accrue.
In effect the common law resident would be able to place limitations on his
widow's interest and still enjoy tax treatment as favorable as that of community
property.
D. Exceptions to the Terminable Interest Rule
1. Apparent Exceptions
To understand the terminable interest rule it is necessary to distinguish the
surviving spouse's interest in the property from the property itself. The termi-
nable nature of the underlying property is not determinative of whether a deduc-
tion will be allowed.81 For example, if the husband owned a patent and be-
queathed to his wife the entire interest, the value of the patent would qualify for
the marital deduction even though the patent itself will eventually terminate or
the lapse of time.3 2 In terms of estate taxation the result would be the same in a
community property jurisdiction. Thus, this example can be considered am
"apparent," nonreal exception to the terminable interest rule because the rule
was not designed for, nor does it apply to, this type of situation.
28 See generally, STEPHENS, MAXFIELD & LIND, FEDERAL ESTATE AND GIrT TAXATION§ 2056 (1974) [hereinafter cited as STEPHENS].
29 For a general discussion of quantitative and qualitative equality in an estate tax con-
text see 19 STAN. L. REv. 468 (1967).
30 An exception to this statement is of course the widow's election. For a discussion of
the impact of the widow's election upon the marital deduction see 19 STAN. L. REV. 468,
470-71 (1967).
31 A terminable property interest passing to the surviving spouse will be nondeductible
if and only if: (1) the survivor's interest in the property is terminable; (2) the decedent has
also given an interest in the property to another; and (3) upon the termination or failure of
the survivor's interest, another person may come into possession or enjoyment of the property
by way of his interest. See STEPHENS, supra note 28, at 5-94.
32 Similar examples of terminable types of property qualifying for the marital deduction
are contained in Treas. Reg. § 20.2056(b)-i (1958).
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2. Legislative Provisions: "Real" Exceptions
Congress enacted three exceptions to the terminable interest rule. The first
accommodates common disaster and early death clauses in many wills, allowing
an interest contingent on limited survivorship to qualify. 3 The remaining two
exceptions are similar in nature. The second exception made an allowance
where life insurance or annuity payments are coupled with a general power of
appointment in the surviving spouse." Equitable life estates coupled with a
general power of appointment comprised the third legislative exception." This
provision in particular has been a source of considerable misunderstanding and
voluminous litigation.'" Numerous requirements limit the availability of this
section.' 7 The interpretation of these requirements in turn bears upon the char-
acterization of whether the provision is a real or apparent exception of the
terminable interest rule.
III. Section 2056(b) (5): A Real Exception to the
Terminable Interest Rule?
As indicated above, two distinct theoretical approaches can be taken to
33 INT. REv. CODE of 1939, § 812(e) (1) (D) (now INT. REv. CODE of 1954, § 2056
(b) (3)) provides that an interest passing to the surviving spouse shall not be considered as an
interest which will terminate or fail on the death of such spouse if:
A) such death will cause a termination or failure of such interest only if it occurs
within a period not exceeding 6 months after the decedent's death, or only if it
occurs as a result of a common disaster resulting in the death of the decedent and
the surviving spouse, or only if it occurs in the case of either such event; and
B) such termination or failure does not in fact occur.
34 INT. REv. CODE of 1939, § 812(e) (1) (G) as amended by INT. REv. CODE of 1954,
§ 2056(b) (6) provides:
In the case of an interest in property passing from the decedent consisting of pro-
ceeds under a life insurance, endowment, or annuity contract, if under the terms of
the contract such proceeds are payable in installments or are held by the insurer
subject to an agreement to pay interest thereon (whether the proceeds, on the termi-
nation of any interest payments, are payable in a lump sum or in annual or more
frequent installments), and such installment or interest payments are payable
annually or at more frequent intervals, commencing not later than 13 months after
the decedent's death, and all amounts, or a specific portion of all such amounts,
payable during the life of the surviving spouse are payable only to such spouse, and
such spouse has the power to appoint all amounts, or such specific portion, payable
under such contract (exercisable in favor of such surviving spouse, or of the estate
of such surviving spouse, or in favor of either, whether or not in each case the power
is exercisable in favor of others), with no power in any other person to appoint such
amounts to any person other than the surviving spouse--shall not be considered a
nondeductible interest because of the terminable interest rule.
35 INT. REV. CODE of 1939, § 812(e)(1)(F), added by Revenue Act of 1948, Ch. 168
§ 361, 62 Stat. 117 (1948) (now INT. REv. CODE of 1954, § 2056(b) (5)).
36 See generally, Note, supra note 7.
37 The following five conditions had to be met to qualify a life estate with power of
appointment interest for the marital deduction:
(1) the surviving spouse had to be entitled to all the income from the entire interest;
(2) the income had to be paid annually or at more frequent intervals;
(3) the surviving spouse had to have the power to appoint the entire interest to either
herself or her estate;
(4) the power in the surviving spouse had to be exercisable by her alone and in all
events;
(5) the interest could not be subject to a power in any other person to appoint any
part to any person other than the surviving spouse.
INT. REV. CODE 1939, § 812(e) (1) (F) ; see note 36 supra.
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§ 2056(b) (5) and related exceptions to the terminable interest rule. The first
categorizes the life estate and power of appointment provision as a real exception
to the rule. "Real" is used in the sense that if a statutory exception were not
provided, a life estate plus a general power of appointment would be barred from
qualifying for the deduction as a terminable interest. The most persuasive argu-
ment supporting this thesis is that Congress specifically chose to label and include
this interest as an exception to the terminable interest rule.'
More fundamentally, however, this theory is supported by the assumption
that Congress enacted 2056(b) (5) solely to prevent prejudicing a long-estab-
lished common law method of estate planning. 9 In essence a nondeductible
terminable interest was made deductible for this reason. Legislative history of
the original 1948 exception supports this contention. "Among the exceptions to
this terminable interest rule is the recognition of one of the customary modes of
transfer of property in common law States. The deduction is applicable where
the decedent or donor creates a trust . . ."0
Furthermore, one's conceptualization of an exception is partly dependent
upon the characterization and perceived scope of the general rule. The argu-
ment in favor of § 2056(b) (5) as a real exception is partially based on the
assumption that Congress' primary purpose in enacting the terminable interest
rule was to effectively approximate qualitative and quantitative equality between
common law and community property systems.
When this emphasis on quantitative and qualitative equality is combined
with Congress' intent to use § 2056(b) (5) as a means of preserving an estab-
lished common law method of estate planning, it becomes obvious that Congress
intentionally confined the scope of the exception. This approach dictates that
Congress intended to preserve a viable estate planning device, the equitable life
estate combined with a general power of appointment, while also insuring that
common law residents would receive as few advantages as possible over residents
of community property states. The stringent income and power of appointment
requirements tied to the exception can be viewed as the manifestation of this
congressional effort. Commentators and courts alike have seen these prerequisites
as insuring the preservation of substantial equality because the widow receives
virtually all of the rights of a fee simple owner like her community property
counterpart."1 Read in this light, § 2056 (b) (5) is a "real" exception to the termi-
nable interest rule and justifies, as well as necessitates, a strict interpretation and
application of its requirements. One court has inadvertently summarized this
approach by stating, "a taxpayer must bring himself squarely within the marital
deduction statute or suffer the consequence." '42
38 IzT. Rnv. CoDE of 1939, § 812(e) (1) (F).
39 S. REP. No. 1013, supra note 17, at 28.
40 Id.
.41 See generally, MiRTENS, supra note 4; R.ABriN, supra n6te 23; STEPHENS, supra note
28.
42 Estate of Jerome Mittleman, 42 P-H TAX CT. MEM. DEc. 1173,112 at 73,113 (1973),
citing Estate of Allen Weisberger, 29 T.C. 217 (1957).
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IV. Section 2056(b) (5): An Apparent Exception to the
Terminable Interest Rule?
A. An Emerging View
While the dominant judicial trend has been to treat § 2056 as a real excep-
tion, the apparent exception theory has recently gained support. Basically, this
approach reasons that § 2056(b) (5) falls outside of the sphere of the terminable
interest rule and is merely a restatement of the underlying principles of the
marital deduction, rather than a real exception to the rule. Inclusion of the
provision is merely a congressional attempt to clarify the scope of the terminable
interest rule and an attempt to prevent its overextension.
The apparent exception theory assumes that Congress' intent in enacting
the marital deduction was primarily one of achieving quantitative equalization,
subordinating qualitative equality. Congress merely intended to insure equal
taxation as opposed to requiring the same types of interests be passed to the
survivor. Marital deduction literature is replete with this idea of quantitative
tax equalization through the so-called two-stage payment of taxes procedure."
Specifically, the marital deduction, by allowing the husband to pass up to one-
half of his estate to his widow tax free, sought to duplicate the situation existing
in community property jurisdictions." The central theme is the complete tax-
ation of all the assets during the lives of the spouses; the terminable interest rule
is used to prevent any escape during the second stage.4 Again, legislative history
can be cited in support of this contention.
This provision [§ 2056(b) (5)] is designed to allow the marital deduction for
such cases where the value of the property over which the surviving spouse
has a power of appointment will (if not consumed) be subject to either the
estate tax or the gift tax in the case of such surviving spouse.4 6
This statement, standing alone, certainly manifests Congress' intent to
achieve quantitative tax equality. If the central purpose was in fact to achieve
this type of equality, a more liberal interpretation of § 2056(b) (5) is warranted.
The certainty of taxation in the survivor's estate, while not determinative,"'
should strike the balance in favor of the taxpayer on interpretive questions relat-
ing to the fulfillment of § 2056(b) (5)'s income and power of appointment
requirements. Statutory amendments since the original enactment of the life
estate with power of appointment provision buttress this approach.
43 See, e.g., STEPHENS, supra note 28, at 5-95; Note, Federal Estate Tax-Fixed Monthly
Payments to Surviving Spouse Qualify for the Marital Deduction, 22 Sw. L.J. 358 "(1968); 19
STAN. L. Rnv. 468 (1967).
44 S. REP. No. 1013, supra note 17, at 26-29.
45 United States v. Stapf, 375 U.S. 118, 128 (1963).
46 S. REP. No. 1013, supra note 17, Pt. 2, at 16.
47 Such an approach would be based upon a concept of a tax at least once every gener-
ation. Difficult problems in utilizing this approach such as determining the time at which the
property would be taxed are treated in Sugarman, Estate and Gift Tax Equalization-The




Legislative developments provide a strong inference that Congress, in gen-
eral, has favored the liberal quantitative approach and thus the "apparent"
exception route. It will be recalled that the original life estate exception was
limited to equitable as opposed to legal life estates.4 Furthermore, the surviving
spouse had to be entitled to all the income from the trust and had to have a power
of appointment over the entire corpus in order to qualify for the exception.49
Judicial construction of these requirements led to the disqualification of any in-
terest which did not strictly comply.5" In response to this strict judicial inter-
pretation Congress in 1954 revised the exception to permit the qualification of
legal life estates,5 and extended the exception to interests granting the right to
income and power of appointment over a specific portion of the property pass-
ing. 2 Apparently Congress had decided to go beyond its previously stated inten-
tion of merely allowing an exception for the established common law trust method
of estate planning. 3 Precise qualitative equality, always unfeasible, 4 appeared
subordinated in favor of liberality and flexibility in estate planning.
While the 1954 legislation expanded the boundaries of § 2056(b) (5), the
quantitative equality dimension was left basically intact. Also, a 1958 Treasury
Regulation,55 under the guise of maintaining qualitative equality and the real
exception approach, attempted to severely curtail the 1954 legislation. In essence,
the Regulation disqualified interests passing to the surviving spouse where only
the right to a fixed-dollar amount of the income or power of appointment over
a fixed dollar amount was granted. In a far-reaching decision, which will be
analyzed more fully below, the Supreme Court in overruling this regulation,
considered congressional intent as it related to the marital deduction. 6
V. Judicial Interpretation of § 2056(b) (5)
A. An Overview
An analysis of decided cases involving the life estate with power of appoint-
ment provision reveals that it has been construed both as a real and as an
apparent exception to the terminable interest rule. Perhaps as an outgrowth
of the principle that virtual ownership of property was a prerequisite to the
deduction, the dominant judicial approach has been to strictly construe and apply
48 INT. RzV. CoDE of 1939, § "812(e) (1) (F).
49 Id.
50 See generally STEPHENS, supra note 28.
51 The INT. REv. CODE of 1954, § 2056(b) (5).
52 See STEPHENS, supra note 28, at 5-106.
53 See note 39 and accompanying text supra.
54 See note 25 and accompanying text supra.
55 Treas. Reg. § 20.2056(b)-5(c) (1958).
56 Northeastern Pa. Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. v. United States, 387 U.S. 213 (1967), rez'g
and remanding 363 F.2d 476 (3d Cir. 1966), rev'g and remanding 235 F. Supp. 941 (M.D.
Pa. 1964).
57 Compare Estate of Allen Weisberger, 29 T.C. 217 (1957), with Estate of Mittleman
v. Commissioner, Civil No. 73-2001 (D.C. Cir. Nov. 3, 1975).
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the statutory provisions and regulations dealing with § 2056(b) (5) .' Generally,
a contested deduction in this area has more often been denied than allowed.
Recent decisions, however, suggest that the judicial shift which abolished the
virtual ownership requirement and favors liberal construction may begin to have
a similar effect on the component parts of the general rule." Consequently, a
judicial reevaluation of congressional intent in favor of a more liberal and flexible
application of § 2056(b) (5) may be forthcoming.
B. Judicial Treatment of § 2056(b) (5) as a Real Exception to the
Terminable Interest Rule
As previously outlined, § 2056 (b) (5) is being referred to as a real exception
to the terminable interest rule in the sense that if it were not for this exception,
the life estate with power of appointment interest would be a nondeductible
terminable interest.60 A basic premise of this theory is that Congress intended
the terminable interest as a means of attaining near perfect qualitative and
quantitative equality between the two property systems. 1 From the time of its
original enactment, the courts have in effect construed § 2056(b) (5) as a real
exception to the terminable interest rule by demanding strict compliance with
its provisions.62 Departure from the statute or its regulations, no matter how
slight, was not tolerated.6 Examples of cases in which the courts have narrowly
interpreted and applied the income and power of appointment requirements are
abundant.
Estate of Allen L. Weisberger64 involved two trusts, the entire income from
which was given to the surviving spouse subject only to maintenance and support
payments to her son. The trustee was given uncontrolled discretion as to when
the payments were to be made and was to consider the amount of other income
the son was receiving. The son was beneficiary of two additional trusts producing
a combined net income of $49,000 annually. The circumstances made it clear
that there was no possibility of receiving income from either of his mother's
trusts. Relying on the remoteness rule applicable to charitable deductions, the
wife unsuccessfully argued that the possibility of the son receiving any income
from the trusts was so negligible that it should not bar the applicability of the
marital deduction. The court, after referring to legislative history stating "the
surviving spouse, by reason of her right to income and a power of appointment
is the virtual owner of the property,"'.. concluded that § 2056(b) (5), unlike
the charitable deduction provision, did not itself create a deduction. Rather, the
court indicated that the exception merely rendered the terminable interest rule
inoperative and allowed a deduction for what Was otherwise a nondeductible
58 See generally, Anderson, Understanding the Marital Deduction, I P-H TAx IDEAS
13,005 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Anderson].
59 See, e.g., Estate of Mittleman v. Commissioner, Civil No. 73-2001 (D.C. Cir. Nov. 3,
1975); Friedman v. United States, 364 F. Supp. 484 (S.D. Ga. 1973).
60 See note 15 and accompanying text supra.
61 See generally, 19 STAN. L. Rav. 468 (1967).
62 See Anderson, supra note 58, at 13005.3.
63 Id.
64 29 T.C. 217 (1957).




In Commissioner v. Estate of Ellis, 7 the husband had created a trust from
which the widow was to receive the entire income for life. She was to receive no
less than $5,000 a year, even if invasion of the corpus were necessary, and she
alone was to decide such necessity. The court disallowed a marital deduction
because state law limited the power of invasion by employing a good faith
standard and, therefore, the widow lacked a power exercisable in all events as
required by the statute.68 Again, this stringent interpretation was supported by
reliance on the virtual ownership assumption:
[W]e are not unmindful of the legislative history of the marital deduction
and the purpose for which it was enacted. But it appears that Congress
looked to an absolute ownership of the surviving spouse in the community-
property state as the test and that anything less should not be granted the
deduction unless it comes squarely within a strict construction of subpara-
graph (F) [§ 2056(b) (5)].6
More recently, the court in Estate of May v. Commissioner"0 disallowed a
marital deduction where the surviving wife had been given a life estate in a
trust and the right to invade the principal not only for necessities but also for
her comfort, happiness and well-being. Even though the power of invasion was
within the sole discretion of the wife, a common law good faith limitation on the
power was held sufficient to bar the deduction 7 because the power was not
exercisable in all events. The taxpayer unsuccessfully relied on legislative history
in an attempt to persuade the court that Congress intended that interests which
would be taxable as general power of appointments should also be deductible
under § 2056(b) (5). The court explicitly rejected the argument that the dis-
allowance of the present deduction coupled with taxation in the spouse's estate
constituted an unfair double tax contrary to congressional intent reflected by the
legislative history. Judge Tuttle dismissed this argument:
We know of no rule of construction that permits the court to resort to legis-
lative history or to other sections not necessarily correlated with the one
under scrutiny to determine the meaning of language which is as clear as
is that of Section 812(e) (1) (F) [§ 2056(b) (5)].72
The majority clearly maintained that § 2056(b) (5) was a real exception to the
terminable interest rule and required strict compliance.
The above decisions are typical of a large body of case law characterizing
§ 2056(b) (5) as a real exception to the terminable interest rule. While in each
case the results can be supported by a literal reading of statutory language and
the principle that deductions are a matter of legislative grace requiring strict
66 Id. at 222.
67 252 F.2d 109 (3d Cir. 1958).
68 Id. at 113-14.
69 Id. at 114.
70 283 F.2d 853 (2d Cir. 1960).




compliance, the equities and the general policy of the marital deduction seem to
favor the taxpayer. Double taxation of a common law couple's property be-
cause of a strict insistence on qualitative equality is at loggerheads with the very
purposes underlying the marital deduction itself. The statute and legislative
history indicate that qualitative equality is of secondary importance when com-
pared with quantitative equality. Yet, by giving qualitative equality a controlling
importance, numerous common law couples are denied the tax advantages which
automatically accrue under the community property system. Equality of estate
taxation could better be achieved by insuring quantitative equality while subordi-
nating the importance of the inherently unattainable qualitative equality. Fur-
thermore, unreasonable and overly technical interpretation of the statute tends
to frustrate the already difficult process of estate planning.
C. Judicial Treatment of § 2056(b) (5) as an Apparent
Exception to the Terminable Interest Rule
The foundation for treating § 2056(b) (5) as an apparent exception was
laid in Northeastern Pennsylvania National Bank & Trust Co. v. United States."
The decedent's will created a residuary trust from which a trustee was directed
to pay out of the income and corpus a monthly stipend to the widow. The sur-
viving spouse was also given a general testamentary power of appointment. The
executor of the estate claimed that since the wife was entitled for life to all the
income from a specific portion of the corpus and also had a general power of
appointment over it, the specific portion should be allowed as a deduction. The
Commissioner of Internal Revenue rejected this argument since the widow's
right to income was not expressed as "fractional or percentile share" of the trust
corpus as required by a treasury regulation." In setting aside the regulation in
controversy, the Supreme Court comprehensively considered congressional intent
as related to the marital deduction. Without explicitly categorizing § 2056 (b) (5)
as an apparent exception to the terminable interest rule, the Court's opinion at
least supports this theory.
The Government, pursuing a "real" exception approach, argued in favor
of the percentile or fractional share regulation as a proper means of preserving
the qualitative and quantitative equality of estate taxation between common
law and community property jurisdictions. It was argued that congressional in-
tent favored limiting the deduction to cases in which the surviving spouse re-
ceived "virtual ownership" of the interest equivalent to that received in commu-
nity property states.75 The disputed regulation was considered necessary be-
cause only if the common law spouse's interest was expressed as a fractional or
percentile share could it be subjected to the same economic fluctuations as would
community property." It was argued that if a specific portion could qualify for
the marital deduction the advantage of a common law resident would be in-
creased: a community property widow, owning a fee simple, faces the possibility
73 387 U.S. 213 (1967).
74 Id. at 216.
75 Id. at 222.
76 Id. This view is also expressed in 19 SrAN. L. R-v. 468 (1967).
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that a declining market may dissipate the value of her interest while the holder
of a fixed interest is immune to these risks. In part the Commissioner relied on
a phrase in the 1948 Senate Finance Committee Report to support the proposi-
tion that Congress had intended the deduction to apply only where the survivor
was the "virtual owner" of the property." The Supreme Court summarily re-
jected this argument by stating: "Obviously, Congress did not intend the deduc-
tion to be available only with respect to interests equivalent to outright ownership,
or trusts would not have been permitted to qualify at all."'
More importantly, the Court proceeded to articulate its interpretation of
congressional intent which substantially coincides with the "apparent" exception
theory elaborated previously.
Congress' intent to afford a liberal "estate-splitting" possibility to married
couples, where the deductible half of the decedent's estate would ultimately-
if not consumed-be taxable in the estate of the survivor, is unmistakable.
Indeed, in § 93 of the Technical Amendments Act of 1958, 72 Stat. 1668,
Congress made "The more realistic rules of the 1954 Code" apply retro-
actively to the original enactment of the marital deduction in 1948, and
opened the statute of limitations to allow refunds or credits for overpayments.
Plainly such a provision should not be construed so as to impose unwarranted
restrictions upon the availability of the deduction.79
As recognized in the minority opinion, Northeastern represents a significant
shift in judicial interpretation of the marital deduction. The majority opinion
gave renewed emphasis to the legislative history section dealing with quantitative
as opposed to qualitative equality, and Congress' liberal intent in providing the
deduction. In effect Northeastern initiated the treatment of § 2056(b) (5) as
an apparent exception to the terminable interest rule.
A comparison of the May case with Guiney v. United States"0 highlights
the various judicial approaches taken to § 2056(b) (5). It will be recalled in
May that the life estate with power of appointment deduction had been dis-
allowed where the property was certain to be taxable as a general power of
appointment within the surviving spouse's gross estate.8" A contrary result was
reached in Guiney where the court under similar circumstances found that the
power of appointment complied with § 2056(b) (5). The husband had made a
bequest to trustees for his surviving wife for life, with a testamentary power of
appointment; the bequest complied with a standard formula clause to determine
the property qualifying for the deduction. With regard to the power of appoint-
ment the following language was placed in the will: "However, I want to make
it clear that I am giving my wife a general power of appointment over this
trust in order that one-half of my estate may qualify for the marital deduc-
tion .. ."82
According to the Commissioner of Internal Revenue, the wife's interest
77 See S. REP. No. 1013, 80th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 2, at 16 (1948).
78 387 U.S. 213, 222 (1967).
79 Id. at 221 (footnote omitted).
80 425 F.2d 145 (4th Cir. 1970).
81 See notes 70-72 and accompanying text supra.
82 425 F.2d 145, 147 (4th Cir. 1970).
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failed to qualify for the deduction under § 2056(b) (5) because by state law the
wife could not appoint the trust principal to herself or her estate.8 3 The relevant
Maryland law substantiated the Commissioner's position. Maryland precedent
indicated that an unrestricted general power of appointment could only be
created by expressly using language to the effect that the donee may exercise the
power for his own benefit or for the benefit of his creditors.8 4 Otherwise, the
power was limited as not being exercisable in favor of the donee's creditors.
Thus, it appeared that as the good faith limitation under New York law had
precluded a deduction in May, applicable Maryland law would be a bar in
Guiney. Interestingly, however, the Guiney court sidestepped Maryland prec-
edent by citing a liberal trend in finding general powers of appointment among
recent Maryland cases. The Court concluded that the language used in the will
went far beyond any language previously adjudicated under Maryland law and
did in fact amount to an unrestricted power of appointment. More crucial for
present purposes, however, the court in dicta suggested that a general power of
appointment, taxable in the survivor's estate under § 2041, was significant in
determining whether the power complied with the § 2056 (b) (5) requirements."
Unlike May, the court connected the two provisions and implicitly gave some
weight to the possibility of double taxation in reaching its decision. Furthermore,
the testator's intent in qualifying for the marital deduction was explicitly men-
tioned, buttressing a liberal application of the marital deduction. While Guiney
did not expressly categorize § 2056(b) (5) as an apparent exception to the
terminable interest rule, there are indications to this effect.
In Friedman v. United States,6 the question was whether an income trust
with power of the life tenant to appoint qualified for the marital deduction. By
the terms of the trust the entire income from the trust property did not have to
be paid annually to the surviving spouse. Only such part of it as was necessary
to provide for her "support, comfort and happiness" after taking into consider-
ation the income from her separate estate was required to be paid. The will
lacked any intent to take advantage of the marital deduction.
The Government claimed that the language of the will in respect to the
trust and disposition of the income constituted a nondeductible terminable in-
terest outside of § 2056(b) (5). Specifically, the wife was argued not to be
entitled to all the trust income as required by the statute but only such part as
the trustees deemed necessary for her support, comfort, and happiness.8 7 It was
further contended that the trust failed to qualify because the will failed to pro-
vide for the payment of income annually or at more frequent intervals." The
executors, on the other hand, maintained that the trust was within the income
requirements of § 2056(b) (5)89 and cited the following portion of a Treasury
regulation:
83 Id.
84 Id. at 148-49.
85 Id. at 149-50.
86 364 F. Supp. 484 (S.D. Ga. 1973).





[The spouse is] entitled for life to all the income... if the effect of the trust
is to give her substantially that degree of beneficial enjoyment of the trust
property during her life which the principles of the law of trusts, accord to
a person who is unqualifiedly designated as the life beneficiary of a trust.90
Ultimately the questions of income entitlement and distribution were an-
swered in the taxpayer's favor. On the issue of whether the wife was entitled
to all the trust income the court cited Estate of Todd where it was held.that the
discretion of the trustees to withhold income was overridden by the' "necessity of
accomplishing the purpose of the trust" which qualified for the marital' deduc-
tion. 1 The distribution question was resolved by an analysis of Georgia law
which provided that if the trust instrument is silent as to'frequency of distribution
of income, trustees shall ,distribute the income at least annually.92 Again while
Friedman did not categorize § 2056(b) (5) as an apparent exception, its liberal
construction of the testator's language is consistent with an apparent exception
approach.
Estate of Mittleman v. Commission 3 is factually similar to Friedman. The
testator had created a trust of the residuary estate "to provide for the proper
support, maintenance, welfare and comfort" of his wife, "for her entire life-
time." The Tax Court sustained the Commissioner's determination that the
income requirements had not been met.9 In reversing, the appellate court exam-
ined the testator's will in full context, including extrinsic circumstances, and
concluded the wife was entitled to all the income with the proceeds under state
law being required to be paid annually or at more frequent intervals.9 5
The Mittleman opinion elaborated on ideas that were implicit in the Fried-
man case. Specifically, rules of construction were discussed in terms of the
congressional intent underlying the marital deduction. The court cited the North-
eastern case concerning Congress' intent to afford a liberal estate-splitting pos-
sibility to married couples where the decedent's estate would-if not consumed-
be taxable in the estate of the survivor. The court continued by stating:
So, in interpreting a will ostensibly within this policy, courts should give
due weight to the testator's desire to secure the marital deduction. . . . We
hold . . . that where a testator intends to create a trust qualifying for the
marital deduction, ambiguities in his will should, if possible, be resolved in
favor of success of that endeavor.9 6
The liberal construction used in Mittleman and its predecessors signals a
judicial shift in treatment of § 2056(b) (5). Reanalysis of Congress' intent in
enactment of the marital deduction stimulated in part by the Northeastern case
has been an impetus. Furtherance of the conceptualization of § 2056(b) (5) as
an apparent exception to the terminable interest rule appears to be desirable,
90 Id. See Treas. Reg. § 20.2056(b)-5(f) (1954).
91 57 T.C. 288, 293 (1971).
92 Treas. Reg. § 20.2056(b)-5(e) (1954) deals with the applicability of local law to
questions of interpretation concerning the fulfillment of statutory requirements of § 2056(b) (5).
93 Civil No. 73-2001 (D.C. Cir. Nov. 3, 1975).
94 Estate of .Jerome Mittleman, 42 P-H TAx CT. MEm. Dac. 73,112 (1973).




if only for the purpose of giving effect to what appears to be congressional intent.
Similarly this conceptualization will advance rather than frustrate the testator's
intent. In the absence of congressional action it will be up to the judiciary to
evolve or to erase the emerging theory.
VI. Conclusion
A framework of "real" versus "apparent" has been used as a means of
analyzing the life estate with power of appointment exception to the terminable
interest rule. The choice of approach has significant ramifications for inter-
pretation and application of § 2056(b) (5). A reasonable reading of the legis-
lative history of the relevant acts provides some support for each approach.
While tax equalization is the obvious goal of the marital deduction, a primary
congressional emphasis on qualitative or quantitative equality, or both, is dif-
ficult to discern from the legislation.
The "real" exception approach has been favored by the courts. The North-
eastern case, however, may be a precursor of significant future judicial develop-
ment of the "apparent" theory. Resolution of the latent ambiguities involved
could best be accomplished by congressional clarification of the statutes.
For the estate planner the apparent exception theory, at its present stage of
development, provides little solace in a troublesome area. Scrupulous consider-
ation of relevant statutory materials and judicial decisions together with pains-
taking drafting remain the prudent approach. On the other hand, the prac-
ticing attorney who is faced with the task of salvaging a deduction would do
well to keep in mind § 2056(b) (5) as an apparent exception to the terminable
interest rule.
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